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The effects of action, normality, and decision carefulness
on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating
role of decision justifiability
Jochen Reb
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Terry Connolly
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on
anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision
mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision
justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the
perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or
using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting
predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier
findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was
normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was
higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a
different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision
carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant
effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision
justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this
context than does norm theory.
Keywords: Anticipated regret; Decision process carefulness; Justifiability; Normality; Regret aversion.
Recent research attests to the important role of
anticipated emotions in decision making. One
anticipated emotion that has received particular
attention is anticipated regret (Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 2007). Numerous studies have shown
that individuals make decisions so as to avoid
anticipated future regret. Regret avoidance has
been found in practical domains such as negotia-
tion (Larrick & Boles, 1995), consumer behaviour
(Simonson, 1992), sexual behaviour (Richard, van
der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), and health decisions
(Chapman & Coups, 2006), as well as in simple
laboratory gambling tasks (Reb & Connolly,
2009). While it seems clear that anticipated regret
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influences choices, much less research has exam-
ined the antecedents of anticipated regret. Why is
it that decision makers anticipate more intense
regret for some ways of making a decision than for
others? Recent research (e.g., Connolly & Zee-
lenberg, 2002; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005) has
started to examine the role of decision justifia-
bility in the experience of regret. The present
paper builds on this research. In four experiments,
we highlight the importance of decision justifia-
bility in explaining the influence of several ante-
cedent variables on anticipated regret.
Determinants of anticipated regret intensity
Previous research has identified three major
factors that affect the intensity of anticipated
regret: relative outcome severity, mutability, and
justifiability.
Relative outcome severity
The intensity of anticipated regret is influenced by
relative outcome severity: The worse the expected
outcome of a chosen option relative to a foregone
option, the greater the anticipated regret (Loomes
& Sugden, 1982; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov,
1999). Reference points other than foregone
outcomes can also affect anticipated regret (e.g.,
Connolly, Ordo´n˜ez, & Coughlan, 1997). The
idea makes intuitive sense: Consider your antici-
pated regret for losing $10,000 versus $100 from
investing in the wrong stock. Clearly, we antici-
pate more intense regret for the larger loss.
Mutability
The intensity of regret is also thought to be
influenced by mutability (Kahneman & Miller,
1986). In a much-cited paper, Kahneman and
Tversky (1982) showed that regret intensity can
depend on whether the option chosen involves
action or inaction. Holding relative outcome
severity constant, they found in a scenario study
that people thought an investor who switched
stocks (and lost money) would experience more
regret than an investor who did not switch stocks
(and lost the same amount of money), the so-
called action effect. Kahneman and Tversky argued
that inaction is, in most contexts, the ‘‘default
option’’, so that it is easier to imagine, counter-
factually, that one had not switched stocks when
one actually did than it is to imagine one had
switched stocks when one actually did not.
Further, they argued that the availability of such
upward counterfactual thoughts leads to more
intense regret. (For an introduction to the coun-
terfactual thinking literature see, e.g., Mandel,
Hilton, & Catellani, 2005; Roese, 1997. For a
discussion of its intimate connection with regret
research, see Roese, Summerville, & Fessel, 2007).
One account of the action effect is offered by
norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). In
norm theory ‘‘ . . . objects or events generate their
own norms by retrieval of similar experiences
stored in memory or construction of counter-
factual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus
is evaluated by comparing it to the norms it
evokes after the fact’’ (Kahneman & Miller, 1986,
p. 136). Abnormal actions more easily activate
counterfactual thoughts of what could have been,
and are thus more ‘‘mutable’’ (i.e., subject to
mental revision in thinking about alternatives to
what actually happened). As a result, abnormal
actions are predicted to lead to more regret about
what could have been (and more generally,
emotional amplification) than normal actions.
The action effect is offered as an example of the
process. According to Kahneman and Miller
‘‘consequences of actions evoke stronger emo-
tional consequences than consequences of failures
to act . . . [because] . . . it is usually easier to
imagine oneself abstaining from actions that one
has carried out than carrying out actions that were
not in fact performed’’ (1986, p. 145). Note that
considerations of decision justifiability play no
role in this argument.
Consistent with the mutability account of
regret intensity, regret has been found to be
judged more intense after action, as compared to
inaction (Landman, 1987), and after personally
unusual behaviours, as compared to personally
normal behaviours (Kahneman & Miller, 1986;
Seta, McElroy, & Seta, 2001). However, some
research results appear to be inconsistent with the
mutability account. For example, N’gbala and
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Branscombe (1997) found an action effect only
in a within-subjects design, not in a between-
subjects design. They argued plausibly that
norm theory would have predicted just the
opposite. In the within-subjects case, the argu-
ment based on the differential availability of
counterfactuals is moot because both action
(abnormal) and inaction (normal) alternatives are
explicitly given to the participants as part of the
experimental materials. (It should be noted that
Baron & Ritov, 1994, read norm theory as
consistent with these data.) Other research has
found examples of more intense regret following
inaction rather than action (e.g., Connolly & Reb,
2003; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).
Perceptions of decision justifiability
Findings such as these, together with theoretical
arguments (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Sugden,
1985), have led to the identification of a third
potential influence on the intensity of anticipated
regret: the justifiability of the decision (Connolly
& Reb, 2005; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002).
The notion of justifiability here is essentially the
everyday meaning of the word: the perception that
one has adequate reasons, evidence, logic or
arguments to support the choice one has made
or is about to make (see also Nozick, 1993). The
same notion is central to older cognitive consis-
tency formulations. For example, in the ‘‘insuffi-
cient justification paradigm’’ (Aronson, 1969),
discomfort or dissonance was thought to be
generated when an individual realised that he or
she had engaged in some undesirable act (such as
publicly lying) under an inadequate monetary
incentive (such as a $1 payment).
Decision justification theory proposes that
discomfort in the form of decision-related regret
is experienced when one discovers that one’s
choice has led to an unfortunate outcome. It
distinguishes two major components of such
regret, one associated with the outcome being
(comparatively) poor, the other with inadequacies
in the decision itself, or in the process that led up
to it. Self-blame is an essential ingredient of this
second component of regret. The less justifiable
that decision makers perceive a decision to be, the
more likely they are to blame themselves, and the
more decision regret they will experience if the
outcome is bad. To a mother, a child’s sickness is
regrettable in itself, but the regret is exacerbated if
she reflects that the sickness resulted from her
careless or unthinking medical decision.
Decision justification theory is concerned with
how well-justified decision makers themselves
perceive a decision to be, the justifications they
themselves consider reasonable for the way it was
made, and the self-blame and regret they experi-
ence when they do not see the decision as
justifiable. A related, but not necessarily identical,
notion of justifiability is central to research and
theorising on accountability (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999; Tetlock, 1985). Accountability is concerned
with people’s beliefs about what others will perceive
as justifying a decision, and with efforts to behave
in ways that meet these external standards. Inter-
nal and external standards may, of course, coin-
cide, but there is no necessary reason they always
will. A mother’s decision not to vaccinate her child
may have been guided by an intuition, a dream, or
the advice of a fortune-teller, and she may feel
entirely justified in relying on this guidance.
However, she may also realise that such sources
of guidance will be unpersuasive to a sceptical
audience and therefore make her public account of
her decision on entirely different grounds.
Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) have shown
that decision makers’ justifiability perceptions can,
post hoc, account for a variety of past findings
(e.g., Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman,
2002; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, &
Pieters, 2002). For example, in a consumer
preference study (Simonson, 1992), participants
primed to think about regret chose the safer
option (a reputable, name-brand product) over
the riskier option (a cheaper, no-name product)
more often than did participants in a control
condition. The product’s reputation appears to
have justified the choice and thus led to lower
anticipated regret. In addition to providing post
hoc accounts of earlier findings, decision justifica-
tion theory has also stimulated some new research
on the determinants of anticipated and experi-
enced regret (e.g., Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002).
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For example, Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005)
found in a series of studies that intention
behaviour inconsistency can increase experienced
regret over a bad outcome. They also found that
self-reported amount of thinking about the
decision, an indicator of decision process careful-
ness, was negatively related to experienced regret.
Reb (2008) and Reb and Connolly (2009) de-
monstrated the reverse effect, that increasing the
salience of anticipated regret can lead to more
careful, justifiable decision processes.
While these recent empirical findings are
suggestive, they have not fully established the
role of decision justifiability in anticipated regret,
and more generally, the importance of different
antecedents of anticipated regret. For example
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007; cf. Pieters &
Zeelenberg, 2007) in their recent regret regulation
theory emphasised the role of justifiability percep-
tions (consistent with decision justification the-
ory). Norm theory and decision justification
theory offer theoretical accounts of the determi-
nants of anticipated regret that, while not mu-
tually inconsistent, emphasise distinctly different
causal factors and draw on distinct bodies of
evidence. In this paper we examine the predictive
power of both justifiability and normality in a
series of experiments within a single empirical
framework. In Study 1 we revisit earlier findings
on the relationship among normality, action and
anticipated regret, and show that a justifiability
account provides a more parsimonious, and in
some ways stronger, interpretation of the data
than does norm theory, the original interpreta-
tion. In Study 2 we show that decision careful-
ness, a common decision justification, does indeed
ameliorate regret. Study 3 replicates this result in
a participant sample holding different social
norms concerning the focal decision than that in
Study 2. Finally in Study 4 we examine the joint
effect of normality, action/inaction and decision
carefulness on anticipated regret, and show that
the impact of normality is eliminated once care-
fulness is specified. Across all studies, we find
evidence of the central role of decision justifia-
bility. The conclusion argues that decision justi-
fication theory attracts sufficient support in these
data that it must be considered at least as an
adjunct to norm theory as an account of antici-
pated regret in decision making.
STUDY 1
Several studies have shown that the normality, or
typicality, of a choice can affect anticipated regret.
Abnormal choices such as unusual actions and
personally abnormal behaviours lead to more
intense anticipated regret than do normal ones
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Seta et al.,
2001). As noted earlier the standard account, based
on norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986),
argues that the effect is due to the easier mutability
of abnormal choices, which leads to easier avail-
ability of counterfactuals and thus to more intense
regret. N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) results
challenge this account. The alternative that we
examine here proposes that normal choices lead to
less anticipated regret because they are perceived as
more justifiable than abnormal choices.
We chose a decision context that has been used
in numerous earlier studies: a parent’s decision
whether or not to vaccinate her or his child (e.g.,
Connolly & Reb, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1990).1
In this scenario, a decision to vaccinate means
taking action, not vaccinating means inaction.
Vaccination is preferred by the majority of the US
1 Anticipated regret rated for scenarios such as the one we used has been found to predict real choices. Wroe, Turner, and
Salkovskis (2004) compared different potential predictors of actual immunisation decisions and found that ‘‘anticipated regret . . .
was the strongest predictor of likelihood of immunizing the child’’ (p. 38), predicting 57% of the variance (demographic variables, in
contrast, predicted only 1% of the variance). The vaccination decision has also been the context of a number of studies examining a
possible omission bias, a tendency to prefer inaction over action, in health-related decisions, a bias possibly resulting from increased
anticipated regret for action (e.g., Ritov & Baron, 1990). We are not concerned here with the debate about the existence of this bias
(the interested reader can refer to the papers cited above as well as Connolly & Reb, 2003, and Baron & Ritov, 2004).
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population (Connolly & Reb, 2003), so we
expected higher anticipated regret for inaction
(not vaccinating) than for action (vaccinating)*
that is, an inaction effect. More importantly, we
expected that perceived decision justifiability
would predict anticipated regret and that any
effect of the action/inaction manipulation would
be partially mediated by differences in the per-
ceived justifiability of vaccinating and not vacci-
nating.
We also manipulated whether or not the
protagonist in the scenario decides to do what
her friends and family do. This manipulation of
social normality was implemented both within-
and between-subjects. A decision that conforms
to what one’s friends and family do (i.e., a socially
normal decision) may not be seen as justifiable
(and, therefore, as leading to reduced anticipated
regret) when evaluated in isolation. However,
when it is explicitly contrasted with a socially
abnormal decision leading to the same outcome,
decision makers may perceive the socially normal
choice as more justifiable (and, therefore, less
regrettable). We therefore expected to find an
effect of social normality on anticipated regret
within-subjects, but not for the between-subjects
contrast.2 We again expected perceptions of the
justifiability to partially mediate any effect (be-
tween- and within-subjects) of social normality on
anticipated regret.
Method
Design and procedure
Participants read a scenario in which two mothers
each face the decision whether or not to vaccinate
their small child against a threatening flu. Both
make the same choice: either both vaccinate, or
both do not. For one mother the choice is
described as consistent with what most of her
family and friends did when faced with a similar
decision (i.e., a socially normal choice). For the
other, her choice is described as inconsistent with
that of family and friends (i.e., a socially abnormal
choice). In all conditions the choice results in the
same poor outcome, a sick child. Thus, the
experiment manipulated two factors each with
two levels: action (vaccinate vs. don’t vaccinate)
and social normality (socially normal vs. socially
abnormal decision). Action was manipulated
between-subjects only, whereas social normality
was manipulated both between- and within-
subjects, as described below.
The experimental materials were presented in a
multi-page questionnaire. The basic decision
situation faced by the two mothers was described
on the first page. On the second page participants
read about the decision of the first mother
(whether she vaccinated or not, and whether this
was, for her, socially normal or not), and the result
(the child’s sickness). They then rated how much
regret they thought the mother would feel over
her decision. On the next page, participants read
about the decision of the second mother, which
differed from the first only in that the social
normality of her choice was opposite that of the
first mother. They then rated the intensity of the
second mother’s regret, as before. Order of
presentation of the two decisions was counter-
balanced. On the final page, respondents rated
several statements concerning the normality and
justifiability of the decisions.
Participants
Seventy-six undergraduate students at a large
university in the southwest US participated for
extra course credit. They took about ten minutes
to complete the questionnaire. Though this
population, of course, has little or no experience
of making vaccination decisions for babies, we
found in an earlier study (Connolly & Reb, 2003)
that their responses to this scenario were very
similar to those of a sample of the general adult
population.
2 We manipulated action only between-subjects because, based on previous findings showing a preference for, and general
acceptance of, vaccination as the typical choice in the population (Connolly & Reb, 2003) we felt confident that the action/inaction
manipulation would affect anticipated regret (and perceived justifiability) in a between-subjects design.
ANTICIPATED REGRET AND DECISION JUSTIFIABILITY
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Materials, manipulations, and measures
Scenario. The scenario, slightly adapted from
Connolly and Reb (2003), explained that the
risk of an unvaccinated child getting the flu was
about equal to the risk of a vaccinated child
experiencing vaccine side-effects, and that flu and
vaccine side-effects were equally serious: the child
‘‘was very sick and unhappy for almost three
weeks’’. The outcomes and risks of the active
and inactive options were thus essentially equal.3
The manipulations of action and social normality
were implemented as follows (different conditions
in brackets):
[Protagonist] decides [not] to vaccinate her child,
[like most of the people she knows/although most
of the people she knows decide [not] to vaccinate
their children]. Unfortunately, her child [gets a
severe case of the flu/experiences the severe side-
effects of the vaccine] and is very sick and
unhappy for almost three weeks.
Anticipated regret. After reading about one
mother’s decision and its outcome, participants
were asked to imagine themselves in the prota-
gonist’s situation and to indicate how they would
feel. Anticipated regret intensity was measured on
an 11-point scale (0I wouldn’t experience this at
all; 10I would experience this a lot). This
measure was embedded in a list of several other
emotions to avoid demand effects. Participants
then read about the other mother’s decision and
its consequences, and completed the same emo-
tion ratings.
Perceived decision justifiability. After completing
the emotion ratings for both scenarios, participants
rated several items concerning the decisions of the
two protagonists on 5-point Likert-scales (an-
chored at ‘‘strongly agree’’ and ‘‘strongly disagree’’,
coded as 2 and 2, respectively). Decision
ratings were on a separate page to reduce possible
demand effects when indicating anticipated regret.
Two pairs of items measured perceptions of
decision justifiability for each protagonist: ‘‘[Pro-
tagonist] made a good choice’’, and ‘‘[Protagonist]
made a justifiable decision’’. The items were
averaged into justifiability indexes (average Cron-
bach’s a .73). In addition, as a manipulation
check a pair of items asked about the social
normality of the decision of each protagonist
(‘‘[Protagonist] chose the same alternative as
most people she knows’’).
Results
Manipulation check
A between-subjects analysis of variance (AN-
OVA) on social normality ratings found the
expected main effect of the manipulation (socially
normal M1.47, socially abnormal M1.23),
F(1, 72)92.09, pB .001. The same main effect
was also revealed in a mixed-model ANOVA,
F(1, 73)139.70, pB .001. No other effects (of
action, order, and interactions) on rated social
normality were significant, all ps .1.
Experimental effects on anticipated regret
Action. We first analysed only the responses to
the first decision in a between-subjects ANOVA
with action and social normality as between-
subjects factors. This analysis revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for Action, F(1, 72)5.24,
pB .05, hp2 .07. As expected, a bad outcome
resulting from vaccination (action) was expected
to be less regrettable (M6.76, SD3.33) than
one resulting from non-vaccination (inaction;
M8.18, SD1.73). This effect was replicated
in a mixed-model ANOVA on the full data set
(i.e., including responses to the decisions of both
protagonists) with social normality as within-, and
action and order as between-subjects factors,
F(1, 72)6.64, pB .05, hp2 .08 (Ms6.58
and 8.15). The order effect and all interactions
were non-significant, all ps .1.
3 Connolly and Reb (2003) provide evidence that participants find this a comprehensible scenario and are able to construct
plausible explanations for the decisions they would make. Interestingly, a preference for action or inaction per se is very rarely
mentioned in these explanations.
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Social normality. A between-subjects ANOVA
considering only the first decisions showed no
significant difference between-subjects in antici-
pated regret intensity between socially normal
(M7.50, SD2.30) and socially abnormal
(M7.48, SD3.06) decisions, F(1, 72)0.00,
ns, hp2 .000. However, the mixed-model AN-
OVA revealed a significant within-subjects effect
of Social Normality, F(1, 72)10.03, pB .01,
hp2 .12. When normal and abnormal choices
were explicitly compared, the socially normal
choice was considered less regrettable (M7.09)
than the socially abnormal choice (M7.68).
Thus, the manipulation of social normality had a
significant influence only when highlighted in a
within-subjects design.
The role of perceived decision justifiability
We conducted several analyses to examine
whether perceived justifiability explained the
observed anticipated regret ratings. We first
examined whether justifiability perceptions
mediated the between-subjects effect of action
on anticipated regret, following the Baron and
Kenny (1986) procedure. First, consistent with
the justifiability account, the more a decision was
perceived as justifiable, the less regrettable it was
anticipated to be in the event of a bad outcome,
b.37, t3.46, pB .01. Second, action af-
fected perceived justifiability as expected such that
a decision to vaccinate was perceived as more
justifiable (M0.57) than a decision not to
vaccinate (M0.03), F(1, 72)5.37, pB .05,
hp2 .07. Third, when regressing anticipated
regret on both action and perceived justifiability,
the effect of action became just significant
(b .18, t1.67, p .05, one-tailed), and per-
ceived justifiability remained a significant predic-
tor (b.33, t2.99, pB .01). A Sobel (1982)
test for mediation was significant (z1.83,
pB .05, one-tailed). These analyses suggest that
perceived justifiability partially mediated the
effect of action on anticipated regret.
We next examined whether justifiability per-
ceptions also mediated the within-subjects effect
of social normality on anticipated regret. First, we
found in two linear regression analyses that a
more justifiable decision was expected to be
less regrettable in both the socially normal con-
dition (b.37, t3.50, pB .01) and the
socially abnormal condition (b.42, t3.98,
pB .001). Second, a socially normal choice was
perceived as more justifiable (M0.40) than a
socially abnormal choice (M0.16), F(1, 73)
5.54, pB .05, hp2 .07.
Mediation of within-subjects effects cannot be
tested using the Baron and Kenny (1986) proce-
dure. However, Judd, Kenny, and McClelland
(2001) describe a way to test for mediation of
within-subjects effects when both the dependent
variable and the presumed mediator are measured
twice (i.e., once for each within-subjects condi-
tion), as in the present case. As Judd et al. have
shown, significant mediation is demonstrated
when the difference between the two measures
of the mediator significantly predicts the differ-
ence between the two measures of the dependent
variable. A regression with both the sum and the
difference in the two mediator measures as
predictors of the difference in the dependent
variable showed a significant prediction by the
difference score (b .27, t2.44, p .05) show-
ing that perceived justifiability mediated the effect
of social normality on anticipated regret.4 Because
the intercept in this regression model was sig-
nificant (t2.66, p .01) including the centred
sum of the two mediator variables, the mediation
was partial (see Judd et al.).
Discussion
Study 1 examined the effect of action/inaction
and social normality on anticipated regret, and the
4 Moderation exists when the sum of the repeated mediator measures predicts the difference of the repeated dependent variable
measures. While we were not interested in a potential moderating role in the present context, Judd et al. (2001) recommend
including both difference and sum predictors in order not to mis-specify the model. We have followed their advice in our analysis
and found no significant moderating role of perceived justifiability.
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role of perceived decision justifiability in mediat-
ing this effect. We found that anticipated regret
was affected by the between-subjects action
manipulation, with inaction leading to higher
anticipated regret, and by the within-subjects
social normality manipulation, with socially ab-
normal choices leading to more intense antici-
pated regret.
We also found correlational evidence for an
important role of justifiability perceptions in
determining anticipated regret. First, the more
justifiable a decision was perceived to be, the less
regrettable it was expected to be in the event of a
bad outcome. Second, action and social normality
affected perceived decision justifiability and an-
ticipated regret in a consistent direction. Third,
mediation analyses found that perceived justifia-
bility mediated both the effect of action and that of
social normality on anticipated regret. Finally,
highlighting the difference in social normality
between the two protagonists by a within-subjects
manipulation led to a significant effect of normal-
ity on anticipated regret. No such difference was
seen in a between-subjects manipulation. This
finding seems to run counter to a norm theory
account, following N’gbala and Branscombe’s
(1997) argument reviewed earlier.
In Study 1, the evidence suggesting a key role
for justifiability perceptions in determining an-
ticipated regret came from process measures. In
Study 2 we explicitly manipulated justifiability as
an experimental factor by describing the protago-
nist’s decision process as either conscientious and
careful, or as casual and unthinking.
STUDY 2
Previous studies of justification and anticipated
regret have examined justifications that are
highly context specific: previous experience with
a particular product (Inman & Zeelenberg,
2002), the reputation enjoyed by a specific brand
(Simonson, 1992), or an individual’s entrepre-
neurial personality (Seta et al., 2001). Study 1
suggested that another consideration, social nor-
mality, might serve as a regret-reducing justifica-
tion. In Study 2 we examine a justification that is
potentially relevant to a wide range of choices:
the care and thoroughness of the decision process
itself. Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that
anticipatory regret can motivate what they call a
‘‘vigilant decision process’’. Our question here is
whether the use of such a process does, in fact,
lead to reduced expectations of regret.5
Method
Design and procedure
In Study 2 we manipulated action/inaction be-
tween-subjects. Decision process carefulness was
manipulated between-subjects across three levels:
a careful decision, a careless decision, or a control
condition in which no information on the deci-
sion process was provided.
Participants
One hundred eighty undergraduate students
enrolled in an introductory course in organisa-
tional behaviour at a large university in the
southwest US participated for extra-credit. They
took about 10 minutes to complete the experi-
mental materials.
Materials and measures
We used the same vaccination scenario as in
Study 1, with the same action/inaction manipula-
tion and the same negative outcome for the child
in all conditions. Decision process carefulness was
manipulated as follows. The careful decision
process was described as:
5 We recognise that there is an important and on-going debate on the broad issue of decision quality, coherence, outcome bias,
cardinality, etc. We intend no novel contribution to this discussion here. We suggest only that, in a wide range of decision settings,
a process described as careful, thorough, and drawing on a range of available information will be perceived as better justified than
one that has none of these features. Our participants seem to agree with this judgement.
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[Protagonist] talked to several doctors, read
medical journals, consulted with family and
friends, and thought seriously about what to do.
The careless decision process was described as:
[Protagonist] did not collect any information, did
not talk with friends or doctors before she made
the decision, and didn’t think very seriously about
the decision.
No information on the decision process was
provided in the control condition.
As in Study 1, anticipated regret was measured
immediately after the participant read each scenario,
using the same 11-point (010) scale as before.
Results and discussion
An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for
Decision Process Carefulness, F(2, 17)11.30,
pB .001, hp2 .12. As expected, anticipated regret
intensity was lower for a careful decision process
(M5.64, SD3.01) than for a careless process
(M7.67, SD2.57), pB .001. Pairwise com-
parisons showed that anticipated regret in the
control condition (M7.56, SD2.49) was
significantly different from (and higher than)
the careful condition, p .001, but not from the
careless condition, p .81. Whether the decision
was to vaccinate or not (action/inaction) did not
affect anticipated regret, F(1, 174)0.47, ns,
hp2 .003, and the CarefulnessAction interac-
tion was not significant, F(2, 174)0.81, ns,
hp2 .01.
As predicted, a bad outcome following a
justifiable, careful decision process was expected
to lead to less intense regret than an equally bad
outcome following a careless decision process.
These results are consistent with decision justifi-
cation theory and provide further evidence for the
important role of perceived justifiability in deter-
mining anticipated regret. The pattern of means
suggests that anticipated regret was significantly
reduced by using a careful decision process, but
not significantly increased by using a careless
process, as compared to the control (no process
information) condition.
In contrast to Study 1, whether the decision
was to act or not did not affect anticipated regret.
A possible explanation for this lack of an effect is
that different justifications are not simply addi-
tive in their effects. In the presence of a strong
justification, the influence of weaker justifications
may be reduced or eliminated. As we argued
earlier, the carefulness of the decision process is
likely a strong justification of a choice. When a
person makes a choice after collecting a lot of
information and deliberating carefully, either
choice (i.e., vaccinating and not vaccinating)
may seem justified, so that the effect of action/
inaction disappears. However, in the absence of
this process information vaccinating might ap-
pear more justified as it reflects the majority
choice. If this is correct then the effect of action
should not have been crowded out in the control
condition, in which no information on the
decision process carefulness was given. The
results show that the difference in anticipated
regret between action (M6.93, SD2.87) and
inaction (M8.12, SD2.03) in the control
condition was substantial (diff1.19) and much
larger than in the careful process condition
(diff0.04, action, M5.62, inaction, M
5.66, p .96, hp2 .000) or the careless process
condition (diff0.31, action, M7.82, inaction,
M7.51, p .82, hp2 .003). Although the
effect failed to reach significance, F(1, 30)
1.86, p .18, possibly due to the small sample
size, the effect size, hp2 .06, is comparable
to that of the action manipulation in Study 1,
hp2 .07.
The results suggest a possible contest between
alternative justifications, in which a moderate
preference for vaccination (the US norm: see
Connolly & Reb, 2003) is pitted against a general
approval of careful decision processes. This im-
plies that, in a more strongly pro-vaccination
sample, the action/inaction effect should be
apparent even in the presence of decision process
carefulness information. Study 3 tested this idea
using a sample from a population with strong pro-
vaccination norms. It also provided an indepen-
dent test of decision process carefulness as a
regret-reducing justification.
ANTICIPATED REGRET AND DECISION JUSTIFIABILITY
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STUDY 3
Method
Design and procedure
Study 3 used the same design and procedure as
Study 2 except that decision process carefulness
was manipulated across only two levels: the
process was either careful or careless.
Participants
The study was conducted in Singapore, a society
with strong pro-vaccination norms and attitudes,
and vaccination rates even higher than those in
the US and in excess of 96% (World Health
Organization, 2006). Participants were 190 un-
dergraduate students taking an introductory
course in organisational behaviour at a local
university. They thus closely match the sample
in Study 2 for age and interests, except for the
country from which the sample was drawn.
Results and discussion
Experimental effects on anticipated regret
An ANOVA again revealed a significant main
effect for decision process carefulness, F(1, 186)
6.10, p .01, hp2 .03. Anticipated regret was
lower when the bad outcome followed a justifiable,
careful decision process (M7.03, SD2.72)
than when it followed a careless process (M
8.08, SD2.60). In addition, we now found a
significant effect of action, F(1, 186)8.81, pB
.01, hp2 .05. As expected, vaccinating (M6.92,
SD2.99) was anticipated to lead to less regret
than not vaccinating (M8.15, SD2.24). The
carefulnessaction interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 186)0.54, ns, hp2 .003.
Comparison of Study 2 and Study 3 samples
If our multiple-justifications argument is correct,
pooling Study 2 and Study 3 samples should show
a significant interaction between sample (US vs.
Singapore) and action, such that the effect of
action is stronger in the Study 3 sample than the
Study 2 sample. Consistent with this prediction,
an ANOVA with Sample (US vs. Singapore),
action/inaction, and Decision Process Carefulness
(careful vs. careless) as factors revealed a signifi-
cant interaction between Sample and Action, F(1,
330)4.51, pB .05, hp2 .01. The interaction is
such that Inaction (non-vaccination) increased
anticipated regret in the Singaporean sample,
but not in the US sample (see detailed results
described above).
The findings from Study 3 add further evi-
dence of the role of justifiability in anticipated
regret. First, in independent samples drawn from
two substantially different populations (US and
Singaporean students), decision process careful-
ness predicted anticipated regret. Second, the data
also suggest a possible process by which two
justifications interact. When a strong justification
(careful process) and a weak justification (vaccina-
tion, for the US sample) combine, the second
effect is suppressed, and the action/inaction effect
disappears. When the same strong justification
combines with a second strong justification
(vaccination, for the Singapore sample), both
effects remain.
STUDY 4
Study 1 showed that anticipated regret is reduced
if the precipitating behaviour is socially normal,
but the effect appears to be mediated by percep-
tions of decision justifiability rather than by the
mutability mechanism proposed by norm theory.
Study 2 showed that decision carefulness, a
decision justification, serves a similar regret-
reducing role. Study 3 replicates this result, and
also suggests a possible combining rule: Two
strong justifications show additive effects, while
a weak justification may be overwhelmed when it
is combined with a strong one. What, then, is the
effect on anticipated regret of providing informa-
tion on both decision process carefulness and
decision normality? Study 4 examines the joint
effect of the variables examined in Studies 13 by
manipulating decision process carefulness, social
normality, and action/inaction within one experi-
ment. The strong prediction is that of the
three factors, only the justification manipulation
REB AND CONNOLLY
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(decision carefulness) will show a significant effect
on anticipated regret, and that this effect will be
mediated by perceived decision justifiability.
Method
Design and procedure
Participants read about a protagonist who either
vaccinated her child or not, a choice that either
did or did not conform with the choice made by
her social peers, and after engaging in either a
careful or a careless decision process. Thus, we
manipulated between-subjects three factors each
with two levels: action/inaction, social normality,
and decision process carefulness.
Participants
One hundred sixty-six undergraduate students at
a large south-western university in the US
participated for extra credit. They took about
ten minutes to complete the questionnaire.
Materials and measures
The materials and measures were identical to
those of Study 1 except for the three manipula-
tions described above. The relevant paragraph of
the scenario in the careful/socially normal/action
condition read as follows:
[Protagonist] gives the matter a lot of thought,
consults several doctors and medical journals, and
talks to her family and friends. Finally, she decides
to vaccinate her child, like most of the people she
knows. Unfortunately, her child experiences the
severe side-effects of the vaccine and is very sick
and unhappy for almost three weeks.
In the careless/socially abnormal/inaction condi-
tion this paragraph read:
[Protagonist] doesn’t give the matter much
thought, nor does she discuss it with her doctor,
her family or her friends. She just decides not to
vaccinate her child, although most of the people
she knows decide to vaccinate their children.
Unfortunately, her child gets a severe case of the
flu and is very sick and unhappy for almost three
weeks.
The remaining six conditions were constructed by
appropriate combinations of the three experimen-
tal factors.
Anticipated regret was measured as in the
previous studies. Perceived decision justifiability
was measured with the same two items as in
Study 1. Manipulation checks asked about the
carefulness of the decision process (‘‘[Protagonist]
followed a careful decision process’’) and the social
normality of the decision (‘‘[Protagonist] chose
the same alternative as most people she knows’’)
using the same 5-point Likert scale response
format as in Study 1.
Results
Manipulation checks
Perceptions of decision process carefulness
showed the expected main effect for the decision
process carefulness manipulation, F(1, 158)
254.41, pB .001 (careful M1.51, careless
M1.33); no other main effect or interaction
on perceptions of decision process carefulness was
significant, all ps .1. Perceived social normality
showed the expected main effect of the social
normality manipulation, F(1, 158)127.14, pB
.001 (socially normal M0.99, socially abnormal
M1.24); no other main effect or interaction
on perceived social normality was significant, all
ps .1.
Experimental effects on anticipated regret
An ANOVA showed that anticipated regret was
lower for a careful decision process (M6.49, SD
3.36) than for a careless process (M7.52, SD
2.81), F(1, 158)4.58, pB.05, hp2.03. The
effect for action was non-significant, F(1, 158)
0.97, ns, hp2.01 (action M6.78, SD3.08,
inaction M7.25, SD3.15). The effect for social
normality was also non-significant, F(1, 158)
1.11, ns, hp2.01 (socially normal M7.29,
SD3.07, socially abnormal M6.65, SD
3.16), as were all of the interaction terms, all ps.1.
The role of perceived decision justifiability
As predicted, the more justifiable a decision, the
less regrettable a subsequent bad outcome was
ANTICIPATED REGRET AND DECISION JUSTIFIABILITY
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expected to be, b.46, t6.55, pB .001.
Further, a more careful process was perceived as
more justifiable (b .59, t9.39, pB .001).
Finally, when entered simultaneously both per-
ceived justifiability (b.55, t6.64, pB .001)
and perceived decision process carefulness (b
.16, t1.88, pB .05, one-tailed) remained
significant predictors of anticipated regret. A
Sobel test for mediation was significant, z
5.32, pB .001, suggesting that perceived justifia-
bility partially mediated the effect of decision
process carefulness on anticipated regret.
Discussion
In Study 4 we manipulated decision process
carefulness, action, and social normality. We
found that a bad outcome following a careful
decision process was expected to be less regretta-
ble than the same outcome following a careless
process even when information about action and
social normality was provided. Justifiability per-
ceptions were higher for a more careful decision
process, and were negatively correlated with
anticipated regret. As in Study 1, perceived
justifiability partially mediated the experimental
effect, this time of process carefulness on antici-
pated regret.
Neither action nor social normality showed a
significant effect on anticipated regret. This
finding is consistent with our suggestion that
when a weak justification (social normality,
action) is accompanied by a strong justification
(careful process), it is only the strong justification
that significantly influences anticipated regret
through the process of higher perceived justifia-
bility.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research examined the role of justifiability in
anticipated regret. In four scenario studies invol-
ving a vaccination decision (cf. Connolly & Reb,
2003), we examined the effects on participants’
anticipated regret of three variables: action/inac-
tion (i.e., whether the decision was to act or not);
social normality (i.e., whether or not the decision
conformed to the choices of one’s family and
friends); and decision process carefulness (i.e.,
whether or not the decision process was careful).
Participants assessed their anticipated regret and,
in Studies 1 and 4, the perceived decision
justifiability in the event of the child becoming
sick, either from the disease itself or from
vaccination side-effects.
Results from all four studies suggest that
decision justifiability plays an important role in
determining anticipated regret intensity. This
extends, and partly conflicts with, past research
and theorising that has suggested that the nor-
mality, or typicality, of a decision affects (antici-
pated) regret through the easier counterfactual
mutability of abnormal choices (Kahneman &
Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Study
1 showed that the effects of action and social
normality on anticipated regret, previously ex-
plained through mutability, can be parsimoniously
explained to a substantial degree by perceived
decision justifiability. As in earlier studies in the
vaccination context (see Connolly & Reb, 2003)
we did not find the so-called ‘‘action effect’’
predicted by norm theory. Our results suggest
instead that whether action or inaction leads to
more regret depends on a person’s assessment of
the justifiability of the option chosen rather than
on whether it involved action or inaction per se
(cf. Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Consistent with
this argument, the effect of action was mediated
through perceptions of decision justifiability.
The effect of social normality on anticipated
regret was also mediated through perceived
decision justifiability. Interestingly, we found
that social normality affected anticipated regret
only when the manipulation was made salient in a
within-subjects manipulation. Apparently, in a
within-subjects design, the differential justifiabil-
ity of normal and abnormal behaviour became
more salient, leading to a stronger effect on
anticipated regret. The finding is inconsistent
with norm theory (cf. N’gbala & Branscombe,
1997).
Further highlighting the role of decision
justifiability, we found (Studies 2 & 3) that a
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careful decision process is expected to protect
decision makers to some extent from regret
following a bad outcome. These results were
duplicated both in a moderately pro-vaccination
Western (US) sample (Study 2) and in a strongly
pro-vaccination (Singapore) sample (Study 3),
suggesting that a careful decision process may be
seen quite broadly as decision justifying, and
regret reducing. Finally, the effect of decision
justifiability on anticipated regret was apparent
even in Study 4, where social normality, action/
inaction, and decision process carefulness were
manipulated in a full factorial design. When all
three factors were specified, only decision process
carefulness showed a significant effect, and this
effect was partially mediated through perceived
decision justifiability.
Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) have shown that
the justifiability of a decision (as indicated by the
degree of intentionbehaviour consistency and
amount of thinking preceding choice) can affect
not only the anticipation but the actual experience
of post-decisional regret. This consistency be-
tween anticipated and experienced regret is espe-
cially interesting given other research suggesting a
discrepancy between anticipated and experienced
regret, resulting in mispredictions of regret (e.g.,
Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004;
Sevdalis & Harvey, 2007). Our results, together
with Pieters and Zeelenberg’s findings, suggest
that decision makers may be correct to predict
that making a justifiable decision will protect
them to some degree from post-decisional regret.
Future research is needed to clarify the conditions
under which anticipated and experienced regret
correspond or diverge.
All four of the studies reported here showed an
important role for decision justifiability in deter-
mining the intensity of anticipated regret. How-
ever, it should be noted that, even when
anticipated regret was reduced by strong justifia-
bility, the mean score remained around the mid-
point of the scale. Consistent with decision
justification theory’s (Connolly & Zeelenberg,
2002) two-component model of (anticipated)
regret, substantial outcome regret (over the
child’s sickness) remains even if the self-blame
component of regret associated with lack of
decision justification is eliminated.
The findings hint at the complexities of
combining multiple sources of justification. In
our moderately pro-vaccination US samples, we
found no significant main effects on anticipated
regret of either action or of social normality when
decision process carefulness information was given
(Studies 2 and 4). However, in a sample with
strong pro-vaccination attitudes (Study 3) the
influence of action remained significant (vaccinat-
ing expected to lead to lower regret) even in the
presence of decision process carefulness informa-
tion. Future research needs to examine in more
detail the conditions under which different justi-
fications interact.
Limitations and future research
Several limitations of our studies point to direc-
tions for future research. First, Janis and Mann
(1977) predicted that anticipation of regret leads
to more ‘‘vigilant’’ decision making. Consistent
with this prediction we have shown that people
anticipate more regret when a poor outcome
follows a careless decision process than a careful
one. However, we did not demonstrate that
decision makers will actually improve their deci-
sion processes to avoid this anticipated regret.
However, recent studies (Reb, 2008; Reb &
Connolly, 2009) suggest that this may be the
case. Future research should examine in detail
whether regret aversion, either experimentally
induced or measured as an individual difference
variable, leads to more vigilant, careful decision
making.
It is, perhaps, worth reiterating that in none of
these experiments did we directly manipulate
perceived justifiability. We experimentally ma-
nipulated factors (social normality, decision care-
fulness, action/inaction) that we expected to affect
both justifiability perceptions and anticipated
regret. In Studies 1 and 4 we then used statistical
mediation analyses to show the important role of
perceived justifiability in the experimental effects.
Such analyses can provide valuable information
about the psychological processes through which
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experimental manipulations affect dependent vari-
ables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). However, they are
not without shortcomings (Spencer, Zanna, &
Fong, 2005). In particular, mediation analyses are
correlational in nature and, as such, do not allow
for strong causal inferences. All we can say is that
the results of the statistical mediation analyses are
consistent with our theoretical account.
Two further limitations of our study were (a)
the use of a hypothetical scenario methodology
with student participants, and (b) the use of only
one decision context. The first critique is some-
what blunted by the consideration that partici-
pants’ anticipations of how they would feel in
some imagined situation is the substantive vari-
able of interest, not merely a pallid substitute for
the real experience of that emotion. Also, past
research found that student participants gave very
similar responses to the vaccination scenario as did
a general adult sample (Connolly & Reb, 2003).
We are also encouraged by the findings of Wroe
et al. (2004), noted earlier, showing that antici-
pated regret does strongly predict actual vaccina-
tion choices. However, extension of the present
studies to real decision makers and real decisions
is an obvious priority, as is extension to a wider
range of decision contexts. In addition, future
research could contribute by using some alter-
native methods, such as recall of actual experi-
ences of (anticipated) regret or experience
sampling of (anticipated) regret.
A final direction for future research will be to
examine individual differences in the anticipation
of regret. Such research could draw on work by
Schwartz and colleagues (2002) on the difference
between maximisers (who tend to experience more
regret) and satisficers. For example, maximisers
may anticipate more regret for careless decisions
than do satisficers and set higher standards for
what is a justifiable decision. Other plausible
individual difference variables to examine could
be decision makers’ neuroticism or self-esteem.
Conclusion
This paper examined the effects of normality,
action/inaction and decision process carefulness
on anticipated regret, and the role of decision
justifiability in these effects. We found support for
the central prediction of decision justification
theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) that
anticipated regret is reduced when a decision is
perceived as justifiable. Overall, our results sup-
port decision justification theory’s account of
decision makers’ regret anticipations. The sugges-
tion is that the mechanism underlying the
normality effect may be one of justification rather
than the counterfactual/mutability account norm
theory proposes.
The results also suggest a positive view of the
role of regret in decision making. Earlier research
on the so-called action effect suggested that
anticipated regret might be a biasing factor,
leading to a preference for inaction even when
the active option was objectively superior. The
current research suggests, instead, that anticipated
regret can have a beneficial effect on decision
making, by stimulating search for more justifiable
decisions, and thus encouraging more careful
decision processes.
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